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Abstract 
 Following the global financial crisis in 2008, the Federal Reserve implemented 
unconventional monetary policy through near-zero interest rates and quantitative easing. This 
unprecedented policy has had unintended consequences, including effects on capital flows to 
emerging market economies. This paper studies the effect of U.S. monetary policy on portfolio 
investment in the BRICS countries. Using exogenous and endogenous variables as determinants 
of capital flows, I use a series of panel regression models that includes U.S. monetary policy as an 
explanatory variable of portfolio investment in the BRICS countries. My results suggest that U.S. 
monetary policy is not a significant determinant of capital flows in the BRICS countries, however 
they do suggest that interest rate spreads on BRICS sovereign bonds and U.S. treasuries are 
significant determinants. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Federal Reserve System has a powerful influence over the global 
economy. The Federal Reserve’s dual mandate of domestic price stability and employment 
maximization is the central objective that drives its actions. However, as the central bank to the 
world’s largest economy, the Federal Reserve’s policy decisions impact economies and markets 
globally. Because of the global impact of its polices, the state of the world economy is a significant 
factor that the Federal Reserve must consider when making policy decisions. The unprecedented 
combination of increasing complexity of the world economy as a result of globalization and the 
severity of the Great Recession required the Federal Reserve to implement unprecedented policies 
to fulfill its dual mandate and consider its implications to foreign economies. While the Great 
Recession demonstrated how shocks to the United States can affect the global economy, it also 
showed how the Federal Reserve can dampen the impact of financial failure internationally. When 
the Federal Reserve shifted to a highly accommodative monetary policy in 2008 dropping rates to 
the zero-lower bound and resorting to a large-scale asset purchasing program, more commonly 
known as quantitative easing, they accommodated a long and tepid recovery period that much of 
the global economy is still enduring. Now, the Federal Reserve is starting to normalize policy with 
the end of quantitative easing in October 2014, the first raising of the federal funds target rate of 
interest by 25 basis points in December 2015, December 2016, and March 2017. While it is 
favorable news that the U.S. economy is strong enough to handle a raise in the federal funds rate 
target, the Federal Reserve must consider how these policy changes affect developing foreign 
economies. 
Many economists have started to examine this topic and have found that this highly 
accommodative policy in the United States has resulted in large capital inflows to emerging market 
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economies (Arora & Cerisola, 2001; Bernanke, 2016; Bowman, Londono, & Sapriza, 2014; Chen, 
Mancini-Griffoli, & Sahay, 2014; Georgiadis, 2016; Maćkowiak, 2007; McKinnon, 2013). 
Because interest rates in the U.S. were lowered to the zero-lower bound and remain low at 75 to 
100 basis points, investors receive little-to-no return on their investment. Investors then reallocate 
significant portions of their portfolios to emerging market economies because they produce higher 
returns. As banks in these emerging markets receive inflows, they have more reserves to lend out 
to consumers and to businesses looking to expand. More workers are then hired to accommodate 
growing businesses, thus lowering unemployment. As more people have disposable income, 
demand for goods and services increases, consequently expanding the economy. The worry of 
leaders in emerging market economies is that as the U.S. tightens policy, money will start to flow 
out of emerging market economies, causing currency depreciation, higher unemployment, lower 
demand for goods and services, and upward pressure on inflation (Bowman et al., 2014; Chen et 
al., 2014; Arora & Cerisola, 2001). 
In a speech in 2013, Ben Bernanke discussed how unconventional policy implemented in 
advanced economies, specifically in the U.S., has affected emerging market economies via 
complex channels. He describes how emerging market economies are concerned with:  
…not only the level of domestic demand (as needed to achieve objectives for 
employment and inflation) but with other considerations as well. First, because in 
recent decades many of these countries have pursued an export-led strategy for 
industrialization, they may be leery of expansionary policies in the advanced 
economies that, all else being equal, tend to cause the currencies of emerging 
market economies to appreciate, restraining their exports. Second, because many 
emerging market economies have financial sectors that are small or less developed 
by global standards but open to foreign investors, they may perceive themselves to 
be vulnerable to asset bubbles and financial imbalances caused by heavy and 
volatile capital inflows, including those arising from low interest rates in the 
advanced economies (Bernanke, 2013). 
 
! &!
While the inflow of capital brings many benefits to emerging markets as previously discussed, the 
developing nature of emerging market economies creates complex reactions to easing in advanced 
economies, both positive and negative. The externalities of tightening policy in advanced 
economies causes greater concern than the direct effects of accommodative policy in advanced 
economies on emerging markets (Chen et al., 2015; McKinnon, 2013). Figures 1 and 2 show how 
portfolio flows have responded to the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchasing program. 
Figure 1 displays how the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet increased significantly in 2008 when 
the Federal Reserve began quantitative easing (FRED, 2016). Figure 2 shows how portfolio flows 
of the BRICS countries have been volatile since the Great Recession and the implementation of 
accommodative policy, which were less volatile before 2000.   
Figure 1: Federal Reserve Total Assets 
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Figure 2: Portfolio Investments, BRICS 
 
 
 
William Dudley, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the vice-
chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), discussed this issue in a speech in 2014 
when the Federal Reserve was starting to normalize monetary policy by cutting back quantitative 
easing. He stated, “the scaling back of the Federal Reserve’s asset purchase program...has created 
significant challenges for many emerging market economies.” Even though the Federal Reserve’s 
mandate is confined to domestic goals, the role of the dollar as the global reserve currency gives 
the Federal Reserve a unique responsibility to implement policy such that it advances global 
financial stability (Dudley, 2014). The Federal Reserve must also recognize that the financial 
stability of the world economy has implications that affect the U.S. economy. In another speech 
Dudley gave in April 2015, he reinforced the importance of emerging markets’ economic health 
and how the Federal Reserve must keep in mind the spillover effects of its policy. Specifically, he 
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emphasized how “our monetary policy actions have global implications that feed back into the 
U.S. economy and financial markets. In some cases, these feedback effects can be disruptive” 
(Dudley, 2015). 
To examine the relationship between U.S. monetary policy and capital flows to emerging 
market economies that could have disruptive feedback effects in the global economy, I study U.S. 
monetary policy as a determinant of capital flows to five of the largest emerging markets: Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS). I compare the effects of concurrent shocks with 
lagged shocks by constructing a series of panel regressions, controlling for both time and country 
fixed effects. The first panel regression model measures concurrent shocks with portfolio 
investments to the BRICS countries as a fraction of BRICS GDP as the dependent variable, with 
the monetary policy rate differential between the BRICS and the U.S. federal funds rate target and 
large-scale asset purchases as explanatory variables, along with GDP growth differential, 
sovereign spreads, inflation, and capital controls. My results show that, when controlling for time 
fixed effects, the GDP growth differential is positive and significant. As GDP growth of the BRICS 
countries increase by 1% relative to U.S. GDP, portfolio investments to the BRICS countries as a 
fraction of GDP increase by 1.1%. When controlling for country fixed effects, the policy rate 
differential is positive and significant. As the policy rates of the BRICS increase by 1% relative to 
the federal funds rate target, portfolio investments as a percent of GDP increase by 0.6%. When 
controlling for both time and fixed effects, all variables appear to be insignificant. The second 
panel regression implements one lag period for the policy rate differential and large-scale asset 
purchases. When controlling for time fixed effects, both the GDP growth differential and the 
lagged policy rate differential are positive and significant. As the GDP growth of the BRICS 
countries in the current period increases by 1% relative to US GDP growth, portfolio investments 
	 9	
to the BRICS countries as a percentage of GDP increase by 1.4%. As policy rates in the BRICS in 
the previous period increase by 1% relative to the federal funds rate target, portfolio investments 
as a percentage of GDP in the BRICS increase by 0.7%. When controlling for both time and 
country fixed effects all variables appear insignificant, however the coefficients are generally in 
the predicated direction.  
This paper contributes to the literature by comparing concurrent and lagged monetary 
policy shocks while most papers solely focus on lagged shocks or concurrent shocks.  Also,  this 
paper focuses on the relationship between the U.S. and the BRICS countries, which are the largest 
developing economies in the world.  How these countries react to U.S. monetary policy could have 
a large influence on the global economy and could feed back into the U.S.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses reviewed literature 
concerning U.S. monetary policy shocks’ effect on emerging markets; Section 3 discusses the data 
used in my empirical analysis; Section 4 discusses methodology and specification of the model; 
Section 5 includes my empirical results and how they compare to previous findings; Section 6 
discusses globalization and policy implications; Section 7 concludes and provides suggestions for 
further research. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
I hypothesize that U.S. monetary shocks have significant spillover effects on the BRICS 
countries, with larger spillover effects occurring after the Great Recession in 2008 when the 
Federal Reserve implemented unconventional monetary policy such as near-zero interest rates and 
quantitative easing. I divide the reviewed literature into four sections: the effect of U.S. monetary 
policy on capital flows, the effect of monetary policy shocks on asset prices in emerging market 
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economies, the determinants of monetary policy spillovers into emerging markets, and the 
spillover effects of U.S. unconventional monetary policy. 
2.1 Capital Flows 
Significant empirical studies have been conducted that provide evidence of U.S. monetary 
policy spillover effects on capital flows to emerging markets. Ahmed and Zlate (2014) examine 
the determinants of net private capital inflows to emerging market economies and if the behaviors 
of capital flows from before the Great Recession differ from the behavior of capital flows after the 
Great Recession. Their model differs from other current literature covering similar topics because 
they use a panel regression rather than a vector autoregressive model. Many authors studying this 
topic use a vector autoregression (VAR) model because it captures the dynamic nature of the 
relationship between capital flows and monetary policy. A VAR model captures the 
interdependencies within multivariate time series and allows for multiple dynamic variables. 
Ahmed and Zlate (2014) however, use a panel regression. This provides justification for my use 
of a panel regression. They use GDP growth differentials between emerging market economies 
and advanced economies, monetary policy rate differentials between emerging market economies 
and advanced economies, large-scale asset purchases as a measure of unconventional U.S. 
monetary policy, global risk aversion measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility 
Index (VIX), and capital controls as explanatory variables for net private investment as a share of 
GDP in a particular developing country. They use panel data from 2002-2013 with countries from 
Latin America and Asia (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, the Philippines, and Thailand). They conclude that growth and interest rate differentials 
between emerging market economies and advanced economies as well as global risk appetite are 
significant drivers of net private capital inflows to emerging market economies (Ahmed & Zlate, 
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2014). They also find that since the financial crisis, investors have been more sensitive to interest 
rate differentials between emerging markets and advanced economies, showing that slight changes 
in interest rate differentials provoke large changes in capital flows. Unlike previous studies, 
Ahmed and Zlate (2014) incorporate capital controls into their model and find that capital controls 
implemented post-crisis have significantly dampened net inflows to emerging market economies. 
 While Ahmed and Zlate (2014) integrated new explanatory variables into their model, it 
remains unclear why they chose to examine the countries they did, as these countries appear to be 
selected randomly. They briefly discuss how emerging markets’ fundamentals are determinants of 
capital flows, however they do not include any country characteristics in their model besides 
capital controls. Also, their model assumes that interest rates in emerging markets are independent 
of the U.S. federal funds rate, while some may be pegged to the U.S. rate. The authors show that 
a study on this topic can be done without a VAR model, providing justification for why I am using 
a panel regression. However, I include country characteristics in my model. 
 McKinnon (2013) presents a theoretical argument discussing the “hot money” inflows 
emerging market economies receive when advanced economies implement highly accommodative 
policy. The term hot money refers to capital that flows through financial markets from countries 
with low interest rates to countries with high interest rates. McKinnon (2013) criticizes advanced 
economies for taking on accommodative policies by lowering interest rates to the zero-lower 
bound and focuses on the negative effects of large capital inflows on the global economy, which 
is a unique approach compared to other current literature. His main argument centers around carry 
traders who borrow money in low-interest rate economies and invest in countries with a higher 
rate of return. These types of trades explain how the majority of capital inflows to emerging market 
economies originate. When the interest rate differential between the U.S. and emerging markets is 
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large, capital flows from the U.S. to emerging market economies increase, creating inflationary 
pressures and currency appreciation in emerging market economies. Central banks in emerging 
market economies are then forced to stabilize their exchange rate to keep exports competitive. 
McKinnon (2013) focuses his argument on the U.S. and China, discussing China’s exchange rate 
stabilization.  He argues that China is forced to buy U.S. dollars to avoid currency appreciation 
caused by large capital inflows from the U.S. (McKinnon, 2013). McKinnon (2013) continues to 
argue that highly accommodative monetary policy in the U.S. is causing financial repression, 
which refers to the actions governments take to reduce debt, in the U.S. and in China. However, 
his arguments are strictly negative and fail to acknowledge the findings of current literature that 
state how accommodative policy has had some positive effects on emerging market economies.  He 
does state valid points explaining the mechanics of capital flows from advanced economies to 
emerging market economies that are relevant to this paper, such as the contribution carry traders 
have towards capital flows. Also, McKinnon (2013) justifies my implementation of interest rate 
differentials between the U.S. and BRICS interest rates as an explanatory variable in my model. 
Banerjee et al. (2016) question the effectiveness of “self-oriented” monetary policy that is 
implemented across the globe. Advanced economies like the U.S. that are at the “financial center” 
of the global economy fulfill a domestic mandate that exclusively takes into account national 
considerations (Banerjee et al., 2016). They specifically examine how U.S. monetary shocks affect 
emerging markets’ GDP, policy rates, and capital flows. They implement a core-periphery 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model integrating monetary policy and financial 
shocks in the core country whose currency dictates the flows of capital across borders to the 
periphery countries. Banerjee et al. (2016) find that an unexpected tightening of U.S. monetary 
policy (the core country) leads to decline in emerging markets’ (the periphery countries) GDP, a 
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rise in policy rates, currency depreciation, and a fall in capital flows. These findings are consistent 
with my hypothesis and further support my reasoning for predicting that a loosening of U.S. 
monetary policy increases capital inflows from the U.S. into emerging markets like the BRICS 
countries.  
The recent spike in volatility in cross-country capital flows has provoked many economists 
to examine the consequences of these large swings in capital flows from advanced to emerging 
market economies, including influences on asset prices, which will be discussed in detail in the 
next section. Chen et al. (2014) study how both capital flows and asset prices in emerging market 
economies are affected by U.S. monetary policy shocks. They also examine if unconventional U.S. 
monetary policy and conventional U.S. monetary policy have similar spillover effects and how 
domestic economic conditions within emerging markets affect spillovers (Chen et al., 2014). In 
this section I look at the contributions Chen et al. (2014) have made to literature concerning U.S. 
monetary policy effects on capital flows and asset prices in emerging market economies, however 
I will discuss the rest of their methodology and findings concerning unconventional policy  in 
Section IId. Chen et al. (2014) conduct an event study of U.S. monetary policy surprises, defining 
the surprise as the difference in yield of the next expiring futures of the federal funds just before 
an FOMC announcement and the target federal funds rate announced. The event study focuses 
more on the short-term effects rather than the overall long-term trend that a VAR model captures. 
They look at 21 countries, chosen based on market liquidity and international financia integration. 
Chen et al. (2014) look at the day before and after a U.S. monetary policy announcement over 
three time periods: January 2000 to July 2007 to capture conventional monetary policy, November 
2008 to May 2013 to capture unconventional monetary policy while the Federal Reserve was 
increasing quantitative easing, and May 2013 to May 2014 to capture unconventional monetary 
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policy when the Federal Reserve was taper quantitative easing.  Unlike previous event studies on 
this topic, Chen et al. (2014) extend the time horizon across the yield curve, studying 1-year to 30-
year maturities. They also use two factors to explain the variation in U.S. bond yields: market 
factor and signal factor. Market factor captures the portfolio rebalancing channel of monetary 
policy, as well as forward guidance provided by the Federal Reserve. This communicates long-
term risks or uncertainty about inflation, growth, or changes in central bank preferences (Chen et 
al., 2014). Signal factor encompasses shorter-term indications concerning interest rate levels. 
Because the Federal Reserve does not communicate their interest rate target plans for more than 
three to five years in advance, signal factor captures changes in short-term bonds up to 5-year 
maturities while market factor captures the rest (Chen et al., 2014). These two factors explained 
99% of the variation in U.S. bond yields (Chen et al., 2014). To test the effect of U.S. monetary 
policy on asset prices and capital flows, they use asset prices or capital flows as the dependent 
variable and U.S. monetary surprises corresponding to market and signal factors as their 
independent variables. Chen et al. (2014) then introduce country characteristics as standalone 
variables and interaction terms. 
Chen et al. (2014) conclude that U.S. monetary policy shocks significantly affect capital 
flows and asset price variation in emerging market economies. Volatility in emerging markets was 
especially significant when the Federal Reserve announced that it would begin tapering its 
quantitative easing program in 2013 (Chen et al., 2014). Forward guidance from the Federal 
Reserve concerning the future course of policy rates triggered larger spillover effects than 
information that affects longer-term U.S. bond yields (Chen et al., 2014). Finally, Chen et al. 
(2014) conclude that emerging market economies with stronger fundamentals receive smaller 
spillovers from the U.S. More specifically, they find that higher real GDP growth, lower inflation, 
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strong external current account positions, and more liquid local capital markets significantly 
dampen the effects of U.S. monetary policy spillovers (Chen et al., 2014). I extend on this paper 
by explaining why the U.S. must consider its monetary policy spillover effects on the BRICS 
countries as the Federal Reserve begins to tighten policy and move away from accommodative 
policy. 
The literature discussed in this section supports my hypothesis that capital flows in 
emerging markets are significantly affected by changes in U.S. monetary policy. This paper fits in 
with this literature because I incorporate explanatory variables from all of these articles, including 
the U.S. federal funds target rate, capital controls, and country characteristics like the GDP growth 
gap and interest rate of the BRICS countries. I add to this literature by comparing the effects of 
concurrent U.S. monetary policy shocks and lagged U.S. monetary policy shocks. Volatile capital 
flows have unintended consequences in emerging market economies, namely influencing asset 
prices and macroeconomic variables. The next section focuses on how asset prices and 
macroeconomic variables in emerging markets are affected by changes in capital flows that are 
caused by new U.S. monetary policy implementation.  
2.2 Asset Prices 
The strand of literature that focuses specifically on the influence of U.S. monetary policy 
on asset prices and macroeconomic variables in emerging market economies relates to my research 
as well. Many of these effects on asset prices are caused by the large fluctuations in capital flows 
into emerging market economies from developed economies. I am not specifically examining the 
effect of U.S. monetary policy on asset prices and macroeconomic variables in this paper, however 
this section shows the effects large capital inflows and outflows can have on emerging market 
economies and why capital flows are an important topic. Arora and Cerisola (2001) evaluate how 
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country risk is influenced by U.S. monetary policy, country-specific fundamentals, and conditions 
in global capital markets. Unlike other literature on this topic, Arora and Cerisola (2001) look at 
secondary market sovereign spreads rather than the spread of new issuances. They also use the 
U.S. federal funds target rate to isolate the effects of U.S. monetary policy specifically rather than 
a yield on a U.S. treasury security. As theory predicts, a rate hike in the federal funds target rate 
would also raise emerging market spreads (Arora & Cerisola, 2001). Because emerging markets 
typically have a higher risk of default, and therefore are more risky, emerging markets spreads will 
increase by more than the risk-free rate (or U.S. rates) rises (Arora & Cerisola, 2001). This 
compensates investors for the risk they are taking by purchasing emerging markets assets. Rising 
U.S. rates could also increase investors’ risk aversion, causing them to reduce their exposure to 
emerging markets’ assets and leading to an increase in capital outflows from emerging market 
economies (Arora & Cerisola, 2001).  
Arora and Cerisola’s (2001) results suggest that levels of U.S. interest rates have significant 
positive effects on sovereign bond spreads in emerging market economies. Also, they find that 
both domestic fundamentals and whether the Federal Reserve is more accommodative or 
contractionary are crucial to determining country risk (Arora & Cerisola, 2001). The authors 
discuss globalization extensively, pointing out that the global integration of the world economy 
has emerging markets’ dependence on the U.S. economy (Arora & Cerisola, 2001). As I discuss 
in my policy implications section later, globalization has led to the increased integration of global 
capital markets, which forces developing and advanced economies to take into account the policies 
of other nations while determining their own. 
Maćkowiak (2007) studies asset prices and how much external shocks account for the 
variation in macroeconomic variables in emerging market economies. His primary focus is 
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whether U.S. monetary policy shocks have a larger effect in emerging markets than the U.S. and 
if these shocks are transmitted quickly or with delay. Mackowiak (2007) constructs a structural 
VAR model to estimate the effect of U.S. monetary policy shocks on eight emerging market 
economies. He uses two variables: the first is a vector of macroeconomic variables in the emerging 
market and the second is a vector of variables external to the emerging market. The first vector 
includes a short-term interest rate of the emerging market being tested, the exchange rate with the 
U.S. dollar, a measure of real aggregate output, and a measure of the aggregate price level. The 
second variable is a vector including the federal funds rate, a measure of world commodity prices, 
a measure of the U.S. money stock, a measure of U.S. real aggregate output, and a measure of the 
U.S. aggregate price level. He runs his model for eight emerging markets (Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Hong Kong, Singapore, Chile, and Mexico).  
Mackowiak’s (2007) results show that external shocks are an important source of 
macroeconomic variation in emerging markets and are robust for all eight emerging markets tested. 
They account for about one half of the variation in the exchange rate and the price level, two fifths 
of the variation in real output, and one third of the variation in the short-term interest rate. If the 
Federal Reserve raises interest rates (a contractionary policy), the currency of emerging market 
economies depreciates and induces rapid inflation, which is consistent with my hypothesis 
(Mackowiak, 2007). He also finds that U.S. monetary policy shocks have sizeable spillover effects 
but are not as important for emerging markets compared to other kinds of external shocks. U.S. 
monetary policy shocks also explain a larger fraction of the variance in the price level and real 
output in emerging markets than the price level and real output in the U.S. (Mackowiak, 2007).  
The significant impacts U.S. monetary policy has on asset prices in emerging markets, as 
shown by Mackowiak (2007) and Arora and Cerisola (2001), highlight why this is an important 
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field of study. Policymakers in the U.S. and other advanced economies should be aware of the 
global effects their changes in policy have on emerging markets and other nations abroad because, 
as explained by William Dudley of the Federal Reserve during a speech in 2015, “...our monetary 
policy actions have global implications that feed back into the U.S. economy and financial markets. 
In some cases, these feedback effects can be disruptive.” 
2.3 Determinants 
Another strand of literature that pertains to my study is identifying determinants of U.S. 
monetary policy spillovers into emerging market economies, and whether these determinants are 
exogenous or endogenous factors. Bowman, Londono, and Sapriza (2014) examine determinants 
of U.S. unconventional monetary policy spillovers on emerging market economies and how the 
magnitude of these effects differ depending on country-specific characteristics.  Using a VAR 
model, Bowman et al. (2014) investigate sovereign bond yields, foreign exchange rates, and stock 
prices in 17 emerging market economies and identify country characteristics that make emerging 
market economies more vulnerable to U.S. monetary policy changes. To capture different channels 
of monetary transmissions, they implement explanatory variables, including the 10-year U.S. 
treasury yield to represent the interest rate channel and the 10-year U.S. high-yield bond yield to 
capture the risk channel (Bowman et al., 2014). They also integrate a control variable that includes 
the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX), a commodity price index, 
and the return of the S&P 500. Country characteristics are broken down into four groups: 
macro/fiscal stability, financial openness, currency related, and bank vulnerability. Macro/fiscal 
stability includes the short-term policy rate, the 5-year credit default swap (CDS) spread, 1-month 
sovereign bond yield, government debt to GDP ratio, real GDP growth, the output gap, and the 
differential between the local 1-month interest rate and the U.S. 1-month interest rate; financial 
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openness includes the Chinn-Ito measure of financial openness1, current account to GDP deficit, 
total local stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, and total exports to the U.S. to GDP ratio; 
currency related includes a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is an exchange rate regime in 
place and a variable that captures whether the emerging market economy has a floating exchange 
rate; bank vulnerability includes the asset weighted average of 5-year expected default frequency 
(EDF) and asset weighted average of Moody’s 5-year spot credit category (Bowman et al., 2014). 
Bowman et al. (2014) find that emerging market economies with high long-term interest 
rates, 5-year CDS spreads, inflation rate, or current account deficit, and more vulnerable banking 
systems receive larger monetary transmissions with a change in U.S. interest rates. Emerging 
markets that are perceived as riskier are also more vulnerable to fluctuations in U.S. sovereign and 
high-yield bond yields (Bowman et al., 2014). In addition to domestic factors affecting the 
magnitude of spillovers, Bowman et al. (2014) conclude that U.S. monetary shocks have 
significant influences on asset prices in emerging markets, especially sovereign yields in local 
currency. More specifically, if a U.S. monetary policy shocks leads to a fall in U.S. sovereign 
yields, emerging markets sovereign yields will also fall (Bowman et al., 2014).  Bowman et al. 
(2014) findings are consistent with my hypothesis that U.S. monetary policy shocks affect 
emerging market asset prices, and I discuss their findings concerning unconventional policy in the 
next section. Additionally, I use the U.S. federal funds target rate to capture U.S. monetary policy 
rather than the 10-year U.S. treasury yield. 
Georgiadis (2016) examines the determinants of global output spillovers from U.S. 
monetary policy on emerging market economies. Differing from current literature, Georgiadis 
																																																						
1	The	Chinn-Ito	index	of	financial	openness	measures	a	country’s	degree	of	capital	account	openness.	It	is	based	on	
“the	binary	dummy	variables	that	codify	the	tabulation	of	restrictions	on	cross-border	financial	transactions	
reported	in	the	IMF’s	Annual	Report	on	Exchange	Arrangements	and	Exchange	Restrictions.”	(Chinn	&	Ito,	2014).	 
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(2016) implements a global VAR (GVAR) model between two countries, adding the dimension of 
transmission channels and magnitude by incorporating country-specific characteristics. He finds 
that the effects of U.S. monetary policy shocks are significant, and even larger in emerging markets 
than in the U.S. economy. Georgiadis (2016) concludes that country characteristics such as 
financial integration, trade openness, exchange rate controls, industry structure, domestic financial 
market development, and labor market rigidities largely affect the magnitude of cross-country 
monetary spillovers from advanced economies to emerging markets. For example, economies that 
are more integrated in global capital markets, less integrated in trade, have higher labor market 
rigidities, less developed domestic capital markets, and have manufacturing industries as a large 
share of output will experience larger spillovers (Georgiadis, 2016). Also, the determinants of the 
magnitude of spillovers differ across advanced economies and developing economies (Georgiadis, 
2016). For example, advanced economies with strict exchange rate controls experience smaller 
spillovers while developing economies that are more financially open are faced with larger 
spillovers (Georgiadis, 2016).   
Georgiadis (2016) discusses in depth the policy implications of his research. He argues that 
emerging market economies can dampen the effects of monetary spillovers from advanced 
economies by increasing trade integration, liberalizing exchange rates, developing domestic 
financial markets, and reducing frictions in labor markets (Georgiadis, 2016). Unlike existing 
literature which briefly mentions globalization, Georgiadis (2016) considers globalization to be a 
primary cause of U.S. monetary policy spillovers into emerging markets. He cites how Ben 
Bernanke’s announcement in 2013 that the Federal Reserve would consider tapering the amount 
of large scale asset purchases it was conducting triggered global volatility and sell-offs of emerging 
market economies’ securities (Georgiadis, 2016). Also, Georgiadis (2016) claims that because the 
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U.S. has a unique role due to the dollar acting as the global reserve currency, U.S. policymakers 
should consider internalizing monetary spillovers to increase global welfare. The question of 
whether countries should coordinate monetary policy to reduce negative spillover effects is also 
raised because spillover effects from advanced economies tend to have larger effects on emerging 
markets than on their domestic economies (Georgiadis, 2016). Georgiadis (2016) provides 
valuable insight on determinants of global spillovers from U.S. monetary shocks into emerging 
market economies, providing evidence in line with my hypothesis that I can apply to the BRICS 
countries. 
 Sarno et al. (2016) also analyze the determinants of spillovers, but look specifically at 
whether push factors or pull factors have a greater influence on portfolio flows from advanced 
economies to emerging markets. Push factors capture global, external factors that “push capital 
from the U.S. to other countries,” including low U.S. interest rates, low potential U.S. growth, and 
high risk appetite of global investors (Sarno et al., 2016). Pull factors, on the other hand, reflect 
domestic economic forces that attract investors to buy assets of a particular country relative to 
others, including high domestic interest rates, low domestic inflation, high growth potential, and 
trade openness (Sarno et al., 2016). Sarno et al. (2016) conclude that for both bond and equity 
flows, push factors explain more than 80% of capital flows movements while pull factors explain 
less than 20%. These findings highlight how international economic forces dominate domestic 
forces when interpreting variation in global portfolio flows (Sarno et al., 2016). More specifically, 
Sarno et al. (2016) find that the most significant push factors are U.S. economic variables, 
including U.S. output gap, the U.S. interest rates, and U.S. stock market performance. They find 
that the most significant pull factors are domestic economic variables such as the recipient’s output 
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gap, interest rates, and financial openness (Sarno et al., 2016). The theories and results presented 
by Sarno et al. (2016) justify the use of many push and pull factors in my empirical analysis.  
Byrne and Fiess (2016) conduct a similar study to that of Sarno et al. (2016) in which they 
study whether global or domestic factors influence capital flows to emerging market economies. 
Where this paper differs from Sarno et al. (2016) is that Byrne and Fiess (2016) additionally 
determine which country-specific characteristics are most relevant to movements in capital flows. 
Their results show that the main determinants for capital flows to emerging market economies 
include both global and national factors. External factors consist of U.S. long-term bond rates and 
global risk appetite (Byrne & Fiess, 2016). If U.S. long-term bond rates fall, capital will flow out 
of the U.S. and investors will direct their capital to emerging market economies. If there is an 
increase in global risk appetite, investors will also shift towards emerging market economies 
(Byrne & Fiess, 2016). In line with other literature, Byrne and Fiess (2016) find that the 
determining domestic factor of capital flows is financial openness. They also find that the quality 
of institutions within an emerging market economy is significant, however I focus on financial 
openness in this paper.   
Reinhardt et al. (2013) also justify why financial openness is a significant determinant of 
capital flows. In their study, they revisit the Lucas paradox which claims, contrary to neoclassical 
theory, that capital does not flow from rich to poor countries even though developing countries 
have lower levels of capital per worker (Lucas, 1990). Reinhardt et al. (2013) account for the role 
of capital account openness and aim to explain the “failure” of the neoclassical model, which 
predicts that capital flows freely across countries. Their results suggest that the prediction of the 
neoclassical model does hold true when incorporating capital account openness. Among countries 
that have capital account openness, developed economies experience capital outflows while 
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emerging market economies experience capital inflows (Reinhardt et al., 2013). On the other hand, 
for countries that have closed capital account, the development of a country has no relationship 
with the behavior of its capital flows (Reinhardt et al., 2013).  Byrne and Fiess (2016) and 
Reinhardt et al. (2013) provide justification for why capital controls are a significant determinant 
of capital flows and why I include them in my empirical analysis.  
Canova (2005) studies determinants of U.S. monetary policy spillovers specifically in Latin 
America, looking at whether policy transmissions occur through the interest rate or trade channel. 
The author aims to quantify the contribution of U.S. shocks to domestic economic fluctuations in 
Latin America (Canova, 2005). Canova (2005) implements a VAR model with a block of U.S. 
variables, a block of each country’s variables, and a block of global variables that aim to capture 
any comovements that occur that are not due to developments in the U.S. economy. His model 
also includes an index of commodity prices, the emerging market bond index, and the emerging 
market equity index to capture the state of the world economy or those influences independent of 
the U.S. and Latin American developments that may cause comovements in the two regions 
(Canova, 2005). His results show that U.S. monetary spillovers trigger large and significant 
responses from Latin American macroeconomic variables. The interest rate channel, he concludes, 
is a significant transmitter of U.S. monetary spillovers while the trade channel has lesser 
significance (Canova, 2005). More specifically, U.S. disturbances also account for a significant 
portion of the volatility in Latin American continental output and inflation comovements (Canova, 
2005). U.S. transmissions also have important destabilizing effects on nominal exchange rates 
(Canova, 2005). The theories presented in these papers are relevant to my argument concerning 
how spillovers are transmitted from the U.S. into developing economies. However, I aim to extend 
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these theories to the BRICS countries, as well as compare U.S. spillovers from conventional and 
unconventional U.S. monetary policy.  
2.4 Unconventional Policy 
 When the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates to the zero lower bound but still needed 
to further stimulate the economy, they resorted to buying large amounts of longer-term government 
securities and mortgage-backed securities while also providing increased forward guidance. These 
unprecedented actions are called unconventional monetary policy. This section considers findings 
about the effects of unconventional monetary policy spillovers on emerging market economies 
from papers that were discussed in previous sections.  It is important for policymakers in advanced 
economies to know whether spillovers effects differ based on which monetary policy tool is 
implemented. The “taper tantrum” in 2013, which refers to fleeing of capital from emerging 
markets that occurred when Ben Bernanke hinted that the Federal Reserve would slow down 
quantitative easing, sparked economists to study the effects of unconventional policy on emerging 
market economies. In this section I will examine three articles that were discussed in previous 
sections, however I will look solely at their results concerning unconventional U.S. monetary 
policy.  
Bowman et al. (2014) specifically examine the effect of U.S. unconventional monetary 
policy on asset prices in emerging market economies and how the magnitude of these effects 
differs depending on country-specific characteristics. They conduct an event study and calculate 
the 2-day changes in sovereign yields, foreign exchange rates, and stock prices around U.S. 
unconventional monetary policy announcement dates (from the day before the announcement to 
the day after the announcement). Implementing an event study in this context captures the short-
term effects of U.S. monetary policy, in contrast to the long-term effects VAR models capture 
	 25	
through lags. They find that U.S. unconventional policies have significant impacts on emerging 
market economies, however this impact is not unusually different from typical spillovers that occur 
during the conventional policy phase (Bowman et al., 2014). Bowman et al. (2014) results show 
emerging markets’ aggregate sovereign yields index fell, currencies appreciated, and stock prices 
rose after the first few Federal Reserve announcements concerning quantitative easing. 
Chen et al. (2014) produce conflicting results, finding that unconventional policies result 
in larger spillovers into emerging market economies compared to conventional policy spillovers. 
Chen et al. (2014) study how capital flows and asset prices in emerging market economies are 
affected by U.S. monetary policy shocks, however they additionally examine if unconventional 
U.S. monetary policy and conventional U.S. monetary policy have similar spillover effects. Chen 
et al. (2014) study three time frames: the conventional monetary policy phase (CMP) from January 
2000 to July 2007, the unconventional monetary policy phase when the Federal Reserve 
announced bond purchasing (UMP-P) from November 2008 to May 2013, and the UMP phase 
when talks of tapering began (UMP-T) from May 2013 to March 2014. They looked at 74 
announcements during the CMP phase, 42 over the UMP-P phase, and 9 over the UMP-T phase, 
broken down into signal factors (capture expectations of future short-term policy rates) and market 
factors (capture the portfolio rebalancing channel of monetary policy, as well as forward guidance 
provided by the Federal Reserve communicating long-term risks or uncertainty about inflation, 
growth, or changes in central bank preferences).   
Chen et al. (2014) find that during the CMP phase, signal and market surprises were of 
about equal size. During the UMP-P and UMP-T phases, market surprises were much larger than 
the CMP phase, and signal surprises decreased to levels smaller than market surprises (Chen et al., 
2014). These results suggest that unconventional policy mostly conveyed information affecting 
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longer-term bonds (Chen et al., 2014). Chen et al. (2014) conclude that spillover effects per unit 
of U.S. monetary surprise are larger for unconventional policy shocks compared to conventional 
policy shocks, with average and maximum UMP-T surprises smaller than UMP-P surprise for both 
signal and market factors. These findings opposed Bowman et al. (2014) results. 
Ahmed and Zlate (2014) analyze the effect of unconventional U.S. monetary policy on 
capital inflows to emerging market economies. Using large-scale asset purchases as their measure 
of unconventional U.S. monetary policy, they find a positive and significant effect on net capital 
inflows, concluding that unconventional policies and conventional policies transmit through the 
interest rate channel (Ahmed and Zlate, 2014).  The authors also included the 10-year Treasury 
bond yield within their explanatory variables for describing unconventional U.S. monetary policy, 
finding a negative effect that suggests as long-term U.S. Treasury yields fall net inflows to 
emerging market economies increase (Ahmed and Zlate, 2014). Overall, Ahmed and Zlate (2014) 
conclude that interest rate and growth differentials, global risk aversion, capital controls, and 
unconventional U.S. monetary policy are main determinants of net capital inflows to emerging 
market economies, however do not explicitly compare spillovers between unconventional and 
conventional monetary policies. 
2.5 Contributions 
My study relates to the reviewed literature by adapting Ahmed and Zlate’s (2014) model 
and incorporating many of the variables used by the discussed studies.  As mentioned in the 
introduction, my main contributions include comparing concurrent U.S. monetary policy shocks 
with lagged U.S. monetary policy shocks, incorporating country characteristics into Ahmed and 
Zlate’s (2014) model, and focusing on the most dominant emerging market economies, the BRICS 
economies. Because the BRICS countries are the largest developing economies in the world, the 
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effect of U.S. monetary policy on these large economies affects the overall health of the global 
economy. While this sample of countries may not be representative of all emerging markets, 
especially small nations, I am not aiming to produce results that represent the entirety of emerging 
market economies, but rather to show how U.S. monetary policy effects some of the most 
important nations in the global economy.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
  
 My empirical methods are based on Ahmed and Zlate’s (2014) methodology. Portfolio 
investment to the BRICS as a proportion of GDP measures capital flows from the U.S. to the 
BRICS. I implement the GDP growth rate differential between the BRICS countries and the U.S., 
the monetary policy rate differential between the BRICS and the U.S., and U.S. large-scale asset 
purchases as explanatory variables of capital flows. Ahmed and Zlate (2014) and Arora and 
Cerisola (2001) implement these variables in their models. Reinhardt (2013), Bowman et al. 
(2014), Byrne and Fiess (2016), and Sarno (2016) all find that financial openness or the use of 
capital controls is a significant determinant of capital flows into emerging markets, so I use Andres, 
Klein, Rebucci, Schindler, and Uribe’s (2016) measure of capital controls. McKinnon (2013) 
thoroughly discusses the importance of interest rate differentials to capital flows from the U.S. to 
emerging markets. I use the interest rate differential between the U.S. 10-year treasury and the 10-
year sovereign bond of the BRICS countries as an explanatory variable as well. Bowman et al. 
(2014), Georgiadis (2016), and Byrne and Fiess (2016) find that domestic characteristics are 
important determinants of capital flows, leading me to include CPI to measure inflation and further 
justifies the use of the GDP growth differential to capture any endogenous factors that could 
explain capital flows from the U.S. to the BRICS countries.  
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Most of the reviewed literature implements VAR models to study monetary policy and 
capital flows because it captures the complex and dynamic nature of the relationship of these 
variables. VAR models incorporate each variable as a function of past lags of other variables and 
past lags of itself. While I use a panel regression rather than a VAR model, which is justified by 
Ahmed and Zlate (2014), I implement lagged variables in a second model to capture similar effects 
of a VAR model. Because monetary policy can have a delayed effect on capital flows and asset 
prices in foreign countries, it is important to incorporate time lags of the independent variables 
into the model.  
  I also incorporate fixed effects into both the non-lagged and the lagged regressions to 
control for heterogeneity. I run three non-lagged regressions and three lagged regressions, each 
controlling for various fixed effects. I then compare the two sets of three regressions to see whether 
the lagged had a larger influence on capital flows than the non-lagged.2  
3.1 Specification 
The models adapted from Ahmed and Zlate (2014) are: 𝑃𝐼#$𝑌#$ = 𝛼( + 𝛽+ 𝐺𝐷𝑃#$ − 𝐺𝐷𝑃$/0 + 𝛽1 𝑅#$ − 𝑅$/0 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑅𝑆#$ + 𝛽5𝐿𝑆𝐴𝑃/08 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐶#$ + 𝛽;𝐶𝑃𝐼#$ + 𝜙# + 𝛾$ + 𝜀#$ ?@A8BA8 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽2𝐿. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿. 𝐿𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑈𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
where Equation 1 examines concurrent shocks and Equation 2 examines lagged shocks. The 
dependent variable ?@A8BA8  is the portfolio investments in a country i during time t as a proportion of 
GDP (Y); 𝐺𝐷𝑃#$ − 𝐺𝐷𝑃$/0 represents the GDP growth rate of one of the BRICS countries minus 
the U.S. GDP growth rate;  𝑅#$ − 𝑅$/0 represents the central bank policy rate of one of the BRICS 
countries minus the U.S. federal funds rate target; 𝐿. 𝑅#$ − 𝑅$/0  represents the central bank policy 
																																																						
2	I	also	ran	three	regressions	incorporating	the	lagged	monetary	policy	rate	differential,	lagged	LSAP,	the	non-
lagged	policy	rate	differential,	and	non-lagged	LSAP.	The	results	are	basically	the	same	as	those	of	the	lagged	
regressions	so	I	do	not	include	a	separate	discussion	and	results	table.	
(1)	
(2)	
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rate differential lagged by one year; 	𝐼𝑅𝑆#$ represents the interest rate spread between the yield of 
the BRICS 10-year sovereign bonds and the 10-year U.S. treasury yield.  𝐿𝑆𝐴𝑃/08 represents the 
total assets held by the Federal Reserve and aims to capture unconventional U.S. monetary policy; 𝐿. 𝐿𝑆𝐴𝑃/08 represent large-scale asset purchases lagged by one year; 𝐶𝐶#$ represents the capital 
controls implemented by a country; 𝐶𝑃𝐼#$ represents inflation measure of a country; 𝜙# captures 
country fixed effects, 𝛾$ captures time fixed effects, and 𝜀#$ is a stochastic error term capturing 
other factors that influence portfolio investments into the BRICS countries. The models are 
estimated with robust standard errors. I hypothesize that the policy rate differential, the GDP 
growth differential, the interest rate spread, and large-scale asset purchases will have a positive 
effect on portfolio investments while capital controls and CPI will have a negative effect on 
portfolio investments. These hypotheses are supported by the reviewed literature, specifically 
Ahmed and Zlate (2014), Bowman et al. (2014), McKinnon (2013), Chen et al. (2014), and Sarno 
(2016). I run a total of six regressions: three examining concurrent shocks and three examining 
lagged shocks. Each set of three controls for fixed effects: the first with time fixed effects, the 
second with country fixed effects, and the third with both time and country fixed effects. Nearly 
all the sources cited in this paper use a VAR model to capture lags and the dynamic nature of 
multivariate time series. I use a panel regression for the specification, similarly to Ahmed and Zlate 
(2014).  
 
4. DATA 
I combine multiple datasets from numerous sources to create the dataset that includes all the 
variables in the model. I use annual panel data from 2000 to 2014, yielding 65 observations. Many 
datasets used exceeded this date range, however, I am limited to a common range of years in which 
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all datasets overlapped. I considered looking at a subset of the BRICS to include a longer time 
frame, but the dependent variable, portfolio investments, constrained me to this time period. 
Portfolio investments data was collected from the Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), accessed through the World Bank World Development 
Indicators: Economic Policy and Debt. I choose portfolio investments as a measure of capital flows 
rather than a more general measure like capital account because this data specifically covers equity 
securities and debt securities transactions, capturing the behavior of investors.  GDP data for both 
the U.S. and BRICS is collected by the World Bank Global Economic Monitor and is seasonally 
adjusted. Central bank policy rate data is from the International Monetary Fund's International 
Financial Statistics dataset. This dataset was quarterly so I average the four quarters of each year 
to create annual data. Also, Russia only began reporting monetary policy rates in 2011, so I do not 
have complete data for Russian policy rates. The interest rate spread data measures the amount of 
basis points BRICS sovereign 10-year bonds are over the U.S. 10-year treasury. This annual data 
is collected by the World Bank Global Economic Monitor. Data for large-scale asset purchases is 
collected by the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis, using total assets held by all Federal Reserve banks to capture the effect of unconventional 
policy. The capital controls measure was collected from a dataset created by Fernández, Klein, 
Rebucci, Schindler, and Uribe (2015) in an IMF working paper. This dataset has extensive capital 
controls information regarding specific types of capital flows and whether they are inflows or 
outflows. In this paper, I implement the Overall Restrictions Index that they created, which is 
calculated by the average of total capital inflows and outflow of a country and captures all asset 
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categories.3 I extracted this variable for the BRICS countries to use for my model. CPI data for the 
BRICS countries was collected from the World Bank Global Economic Monitor. Table 1 shows 
summary statistics for all the variables.4  
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
VARIABLES OBS MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
Year 75 2007 4.35 2000 2014 
Country code 75 3 1.42 1 5 
Portfolio investments 75 -0.013 0.049 -0.243 0.163 
CPI 75 88.553 24.363 31.741 142.588 
GDP growth differential (%) 75 4.40 4.06 -5.04 14.19 
Interest rate spread (bps) 75 284.33 249.29 56.91 1372.68 
Policy rate differential (%) 64 6.074 4.915 -2.998 23.327 
LSAP (millions $) 65 1,831,262 1,188,021 725,800.5 4,337,664 
Capital controls 70 0.728 0.235 0.2 1 
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Concurrent Monetary Policy Shocks 
 My first set of regressions examines concurrent U.S. monetary policy shocks, studying the 
immediate effects of U.S. monetary policy on portfolio investments into the BRICS countries. I 
run three regressions: the first controlling for time fixed effects, the second controlling for country 
fixed effects, and the third controlling for both time and fixed effects. When running the first 
regression with time fixed effects, the estimated coefficient for the GDP growth differential is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficients for the policy rate differential, 
LSAP, and CPI are positive but insignificant, while the coefficients for the interest rate spread and 
																																																						
3	Fernández,	Klein,	Rebucci,	Schindler,	and	Uribe	(2015)	measure	capital	controls	by	codifying	the	IMF’s	Annual	
Report	on	Exchange	Rate	Arrangements	and	Restrictions.	They	combine	55	different	categories	of	restrictions,	
ranging	from	bond	and	equity	restrictions	to	real	estate	restrictions.	
4	A	note	on	variable	units:	GDP	growth	differential	and	policy	rate	differential	are	both	in	percentages	while	the	
interest	rate	spread	is	in	basis	points.	Portfolio	flows	is	a	proportion	of	GDP,	so	it	is	a	percentage.	LSAP	are	in	
millions	of	USD.	
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capital controls are negative and insignificant.  The results from the second regression, controlling 
for country fixed effects, producing different results. The policy rate differential is positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% level. All other variables are insignificant. The coefficient for 
GDP growth differential is negative, along with the interest rate spread and LSAP. When 
controlling for both time and country fixed effects, all estimated coefficients appear to be 
insignificant. However, most of the coefficients have the predicted direction. The GDP growth 
differential and the policy rate differential both have positive coefficients, which is consistent with 
my hypothesis. Table 2 shows the coefficients and the standard error in parentheses for each 
variable, with asterisks indicating significance level.   
         Table 2: Results for Concurrent Shocks 
 Time Fixed Effects Country Fixed 
Effects 
Time and Country 
Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜	𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝐺𝐷𝑃  𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜	𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝐺𝐷𝑃  𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜	𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝐺𝐷𝑃  
    
GDP growth 0.011** -9.46e-05 0.006 
differential (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
Policy rate  0.003 0.006* 0.003 
differential (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Interest rate -6.09e-09 -2.54e-08 -9.76e-09 
spread (2.00e-08) (2.32e-08) (2.10e-08) 
LSAP 2.37e-06 -1.41e-06 -2.50e-05 
 (6.87e-05) (4.89e-05) (6.19e-05) 
Capital controls -0.077 0.029 -0.034 
 (0.068) (0.042) (0.111) 
CPI 0.0004 0.002 0.0002 
 (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0011) 
Constant -0.035 -0.161 -0.011 
 (0.094) (0.138) (0.114) 
    
Observations 51 51 51 
R-squared 0.430 0.334 0.505 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Although the results are mostly insignificant, they show interesting information about 
capital flows from the U.S. to the BRICS countries. Theory and current literature suggest that the 
GDP growth differential is a significant determinant of portfolio flows to emerging market 
economies. In the recent low-interest rate environment in advanced economies, investors looking 
for higher-returning assets shift towards developing countries with higher growth rates (Ahmed 
and Zlate, 2014; McKinnon, 2013). The results show that the GDP growth differential has a 
significant positive effect on portfolio investment when controlling for time fixed effects. As the 
growth differential increases by 1%, portfolio investments as a percentage of GDP will increase 
by 1.1%. These results are consistent with Ahmed and Zlate (2014) and McKinnon’s (2013)  
findings who find that the growth differential between emerging market economies and advanced 
economies is a significant driver of capital flows to emerging markets. While the growth 
differential appears to be negative when controlling for country fixed effects, the coefficient is 
extremely small, showing that even though the coefficient is in not in the predicted direction, it is 
little effect on portfolio investment. The policy rate differential, while it is only statistically 
significant when controlling solely for country fixed effects, has positive coefficients for all three 
regressions. As the policy rates of the BRICS increase by 1% relative to the federal funds rate 
target, portfolio investments as a percent of GDP will increase by 0.6%. Ahmed and Zlate (2014) 
support these findings in their study, showing that the monetary policy rate differential in their 
model is significant and positive.   
 Current literature suggests that as large-scale asset purchases (LSAP) by the Federal 
Reserve increase, signaling that the Federal Reserve plans to continue to employ accommodative 
policy and low interest rates in the U.S., capital flows to the emerging market economies would 
increase (Ahmed and Zlate, 2014; Chen et al., 2014). However, my results mostly suggest the 
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opposite and are insignificant. When controlling for time and country fixed effects, portfolio flows 
to the BRICS as a percentage of GDP decrease by 0.0025% as LSAP increases by $1. While this 
is an extremely small increase, LSAP occurs in massive quantities, so this could have somewhat 
of a large impact. Also, these results are counterintuitive and oppose the findings of the current 
literature concerning the effects of unconventional U.S. monetary policy on capital flows to 
emerging market economies. Because I am aggregating and using panel data of five large countries 
that differ greatly in characteristics. Each country is facing different economic conditions and they 
are in turn implementing policy that is specific their situation. For example, Brazil has been 
enduring political instability along with high unemployment (13.2% as of February 2017) and high 
inflation. The Central Bank of Brazil, whose priorities focus on the purchasing power of the 
Brazilian real and a sound financial system, has been focused on bringing down the inflation rate 
over the past year, and it has succeeded bringing it down from 9.32% in May 2016 to 4.57% in 
March 2017 (Central Bank of Brazil, 2017). Other factors within each BRICS economy could 
affect how the BRICS countries conduct policy as well. The Russian and Brazilian economies are 
similar in the sense that both rely on oil prices and have been struggling recently due to low oil 
prices. Russia and China both have highly regulated economies that are controlled by the 
government, which can have an impact on capital flows into their economy (Hutt, 2016). China’s 
economy is also much larger than the other four BRICS economies, while South Africa is 
significantly smaller. India surpassed China in economic growth in 2016 and has lower corruption 
than Brazil, Russia, and South Africa (World Economic Forum, 2016). These factors affect the 
attractiveness of each individual country to investors, and therefore can affect the volume of capital 
flows to these countries (McKinnon, 2013). Because the political and regulatory characteristics of 
the BRICS countries are so heterogeneous, my results are insignificant and inconsistent with 
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current literature. Also, because the BRICS are such large countries, if one country has negative 
results and other has positive, they could cancel each other out and lead to no significance. 
Additionally, if I had access to data for a longer time period, I would expect the results to be more 
supportive of my hypothesis.  
The results show that CPI is insignificant but has a positive effect on portfolio investments. 
However, I expect the coefficient to be negative. This finding opposes the findings of Sarno et al. 
(2016) but support Bowman et al. (2014). Sarno et al. (2016) find that low domestic inflation 
attracts investors to buy assets of a particular country. On the other hand, Bowman et al. (2014) 
suggest that emerging markets with high inflation rate receive larger capital flows with a change 
in U.S. interest rates. Mackowiak (2007) and Chen et al. (2014) generate results that can explain 
the results I present in this paper regarding CPI. They find that higher inflation causes emerging 
market economies to be more susceptible to capital flows and that increased capital flows induce 
high inflation.  
Capital controls are insignificant for all three regressions; however, the coefficient is 
negative when controlling for time and country fixed effects, which supports my hypothesis that 
as a country implements more capital controls, capital flows into that country will decrease. 
Reinhardt (2013), Ahmed and Zlate (2014), Bowman et al. (2014), Byrne and Fiess (2016), and 
Sarno (2016) all find capital controls or financial openness to be significant determinants of capital 
flows. Increased financial openness (decreased capital controls) allows for a more integrated global 
economy and possibly larger spillover effects.  
5.2 Lagged Monetary Policy Shocks 
My second set of regressions implements lag variables, specifically the two variables 
capturing U.S. monetary policy, the policy rate differential and large-scale asset purchases, by one 
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period. Because changes in U.S. monetary policy may not affect portfolio investments 
immediately, implementing lags captures the delay in reaction time in portfolio investments. I run 
three regressions, as I did for concurrent shocks; the first controlling for time fixed effects, the 
second controlling for country fixed effects, and the third controlling for both time and fixed 
effects. When controlling for time fixed effects, the estimated coefficients for the current GDP 
growth differential and the lagged policy rate differential are positive and statistically significant 
at the 5% level and the 10% level, respectively. LSAP is insignificant, however the coefficient is 
positive, which is in line with my hypothesis that as Federal Reserve LSAP increases, portfolio 
investments in the BRICS countries increase. Capital controls, CPI, and the interest rate spread are 
not significant. When controlling for country fixed effects, none of the estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant However, the coefficients for the GDP growth differential, policy rate 
differential, interest rate spread, and capital controls are all positive, which is in line with my 
hypothesis. When controlling for time and country fixed effects, none of the coefficients are 
statistically significant, however, all are in the hypothesized direction except the interest rate 
spread. Table 3 shows the coefficients and the standard error in parentheses for each variable, with 
asterisks indicating significance level.   
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Table 3: Results for Lagged Shocks 
 Time Fixed Effects Country Fixed Effects Time and Country 
Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜	𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝐺𝐷𝑃  𝑃𝑜?𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜	𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝐺𝐷𝑃  𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜	𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝐺𝐷𝑃  
    
GDP growth 0.014** 0.003 0.011 
differential (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) 
Policy rate 0.007* 0.001 0.010 
differential (lag) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) 
LSAP (lag) 1.82e-08 -2.19e-08 2.84e-08 
 (3.20e-08) (2.25e-08) (3.49e-08) 
Interest rate -2.04e-05 0.001 -7.80e-05 
spread (9.10e-05) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capital controls -0.061 0.003 0.015 
 (0.081) (0.045) (0.101) 
CPI -7.06e-05 0.0012 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Constant -0.092 -0.148 -0.098 
 (0.116) (0.145) (0.143) 
Observations 46 46 46 
R-squared 0.507 0.346 0.568 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The main difference between the concurrent monetary policy shocks regressions and the 
lagged monetary policy shocks regression is that the estimated coefficients in the lagged 
regressions are mostly larger than those in the concurrent shocks regressions. This difference can 
be seen in the two significant variables, the GDP growth differential and the monetary policy rate 
differential. In the non-lagged regression, the estimated coefficient for the GDP growth differential 
is 0.011 and for the lagged regression is 0.014. For the policy rate differential, the significant non-
lagged coefficient is 0.006 and the lagged is 0.007. Because the estimated coefficients are larger 
in the lagged regression, U.S. monetary policy shocks, specifically changes in the federal funds 
rate, have a larger effect on portfolio investment to the BRICS countries when lagged.  
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 My results show that when controlling for time fixed effects, the GDP growth differential 
is positive and significant. When the GDP growth differential increases by 1%, portfolio 
investment as a percentage of GDP increases by 1.4%. While the estimated coefficients for the 
growth differential are insignificant when controlling for country fixed effects and both time and 
country fixed effects, the direction is positive. These results support my hypothesis and are in line 
with the findings of Ahmed and Zlate (2014) and McKinnon (2013). The lagged policy rate 
differential is positive and significant when controlling for time fixed effects. As the policy rate 
differential of the year increase by 1%, portfolio investment as a percentage of GDP increases by 
0.7%.  The policy rate differential is insignificant when controlling for country fixed effects and 
when controlling for both time and country fixed effects, however both coefficients are positive 
which supports my hypothesis. Ahmed and Zlate (2014), Arora and Cerisola (2001), Banerjee et 
al. (2016), Bowman et al. (2014), and Chen et al. (2014) support this finding that the policy rate in 
the U.S. and in emerging markets is a determining factor of capital flows. 
 My results concerning lagged LSAP are similar to those of concurrent LSAP, however the 
coefficient is smaller when LSAP is lagged by one period. The lagged LSAP variable is 
insignificant for all three regressions.  The coefficient is positive when controlling for time fixed 
effects and both time and country fixed effects, but negative when solely controlling for country 
fixed effects. Current literature finds that as LSAP increases, capital flows to emerging markets 
increase (Ahmed and Zlate, 2014; Chen et al., 2014). The results for the interest rate spread, capital 
controls, and CPI are all insignificant and the direction of their coefficients is inconsistent across 
the three regressions. I hypothesize that the interest rate spread is positive and CPI and capital 
controls are negative. In the regression that controls for both time and country fixed effects, the 
coefficient for CPI is negative, showing that as CPI decreases in the BRICS, portfolio investment 
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increases. This supports my hypothesis and differs from the concurrent shocks results. The 
coefficient for the interest rate spread is negative when controlling for time and country fixed 
effects, which opposes my hypothesis and is consistent with the concurrent shocks results. Capital 
controls is positive when accounting for time and country fixed effects, again opposing my 
hypothesis and differing from the concurrent shocks results. The reasoning for my results is similar 
to that explained in the concurrent shocks regressions. Because I am aggregating five large 
economies that are heterogeneous, the results are scattered. Also, as Chen et al. (2014) mentioned, 
larger countries receive smaller U.S. monetary policy transmissions because of their stronger 
fundamentals. Because these are the five largest emerging market economies, U.S. monetary 
policy may not affect them in the way that smaller countries are affected by monetary policy 
transmissions. 
 There are limitations to my study that can be improved for future research. Firstly, my 
sample size is small. As the results show due to the lack of significance when controlling for 
country fixed effects, heterogeneity is present among the BRICS countries. Also, implementing a 
panel regression rather than a VAR model could be a limitation as well. My models fail to capture 
the feedback effects that a VAR model captures. Future research should incorporate a model that 
does capture the important feedback effects of U.S. monetary policy shocks with a sample that is 
less heterogeneous.  
 
6. GLOBALIZATION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 The dramatic increase in globalization over the past few decades has led to the 
interconnectedness of the world’s financial markets (Arora and Cerisola, 2001; Georgiadis, 2016). 
We are witnessing a “substantive deepening of trade and financial integration and associated 
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increase in the relevance of spillovers to the domestic economy from shocks in other economies” 
(Georgiadis, 2016). This integration highlights the importance of monetary policy spillovers and 
the feedback effects they can have on advanced economies (Dudley, 2015). Georgiadis (2016) also 
finds that, due to increased globalization, the spillover effects for emerging market economies are 
larger than the domestic effects in the U.S. The magnitude of the spillovers largely depends on 
characteristics of the country, including financial integration, trade openness, exchange rate 
controls, industry structure, financial market development, and labor market rigidities (Georgiadis, 
2016). This is consistent with my results, showing that country characteristics are significant 
determinants of capital flows. Emerging market economies experience larger monetary policy 
spillovers from advanced economies when they have more integrated global financial markets and 
less integrated in trade. Because these policies produce more rigid labor and less developed 
domestic capital markets, manufacturing industries account for a high share of their output, causing 
these countries to experience larger spillovers (Georgiadis, 2016).  
As globalization continues to expand, financial markets and economies will become 
increasingly intertwined and heavily reliant on one another. Arora and Cerisola (2001) argue that 
the “increased globalization of the world economy over the past decade has been reflected in the 
increased dependency of emerging markets on developments in the U.S. economy.” Investors have 
been pumping capital into emerging markets to diversify their portfolio and gain higher returns 
because of changing conditions in developed economies (Chen, Mancini, & Sahay, 2015; 
McKinnon 2013). Because of these intense capital inflows emerging markets are experiencing, 
interest rate spreads have generally “moved in the same direction as changes in the U.S. interest 
rates” (Arora & Cerisola, 2001). Emerging markets are increasingly influenced by changes in U.S. 
monetary policy given the integration of global capital markets. Many of these changes are felt by 
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emerging market economies through effects on the cost and availability of funds (Arora & 
Cerisola, 2001). Also, they provide empirical evidence showing how U.S. monetary policy 
influence country risk in several developing regions including Latin America, Asia, and Eastern 
Europe. Arora and Cerisola (2001) obtain results that suggest U.S. interest rate levels have a direct 
positive relationship with sovereign bond spreads.  
Both the United States and emerging market economies can take measures to lessen the 
effects of monetary policy spillovers (Georgiadis, 2016). My results suggest that central banks in 
emerging market economies should be aware of the behavior of the Federal Reserve, specifically 
on the movements of the federal funds target rate. Also, they should closely monitor the U.S. GDP 
growth rate in relation to their own. Both of these indicators could determine changes in capital 
flows in and out of EMEs. Also, increased forward guidance from the Federal Reserve would help 
leaders in emerging market economies plan their own policy changes to combat high volatility of 
capital flows. Other literature finds that emerging market economies can diminish their 
vulnerability to US monetary policy by promoting domestic capital market development, 
integrated global trade, and loosening exchange rate regulations (Georgiadis, 2016). Mishkin and 
Savastano (2002) discuss the advantages and disadvantages of three possible monetary policy 
strategies for emerging market economies in their case study on Latin America: hard currency 
pegs, inflation targeting, and monetary targeting. Hard pegs, such as a currency board or full 
dollarization, can be beneficial if there is already a sound banking and financial system as well as 
sustainable fiscal policies in place (Mishkin & Savastano, 2002). For emerging market countries 
that do not have the political and economic systems in place to support an independent central 
bank, hard pegs may be the only suitable option for monetary policy. However, for other emerging 
market economies, pegged currencies are “ill-equipped” to counter country-specific shocks and 
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are difficult to exit (Mishkin & Savastano, 2002).  For the five countries Mishkin and Savastano 
(2002) examined, they view inflation targeting as a viable option for medium-term price stability. 
As with hard pegs, a stable banking system is necessary for inflation targeting to be successful. If 
emerging market economies are able to implement inflation targeting in coordination with the 
government, it can help promote fiscal discipline. Mishkin and Savastano (2002) examine 
monetary targeting but find that it is not a viable option for most emerging market economies 
because of the inconsistency of the relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation. Also, 
emerging markets would most likely come across the similar difficulties the U.S. did when 
targeting the money supply, for example, defining and controlling the monetary aggregate they 
were targeting (Mishkin & Savastano, 2002).  
 While the mandate of the Federal Reserve is specifically domestic, policymakers must 
consider the interconnectedness of our global economy and financial markets given the role of the 
dollar as the global reserve currency (Georgiadis, 2016). Evidence shows that changes in U.S. 
monetary policy have significant effects on capital flows in emerging market economies which 
then can feed back into the U.S. economy (Dudley, 2015). The implementation of accommodative 
policy in the U.S. has forced investors to reach for yield, thus allocating more capital towards 
emerging markets and causing large sums of money to flow into developing economies (Arora & 
Cerisola, 2001; Bowman et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2014; Georgiadis, 2016; Maćkowiak, 2007; 
McKinnon, 2013). As the U.S. tightens policy, capital flows will reverse and have serious 
implications on the domestic economies of emerging markets, including currency depreciation, 
upward pressure on inflation, and market volatility (Bowman et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2014; Arora 
& Cerisola, 2001).  
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7. CONCLUSION 
 U.S. monetary policy has spillover effects to foreign nations, specifically volatile capital 
flows to vulnerable emerging market economies. While the Federal Reserve’s mandate is 
domestic, it is important for the central bank to consider the effects its policies have abroad. 
Volatile capital flows can have unintended consequences in vulnerable emerging market 
economies, for example, increasing inflation, depreciating local currencies, and affecting asset 
prices (Mackowiak, 2007; McKinnon, 2013; Ahmed and Zlate, 2014; Bowman et al., 2014; Chen 
et al., 2014). While my results do not confirm that U.S. monetary policy is a significant determinant 
of capital flows (contrary to previous studies), this is likely due to constraints in my study and 
there are many opportunities for further research to be done on this topic. Because the BRICS 
countries differ greatly from one another, my results are scattered. Using a longer time frame of 
data and investigating a larger number of countries to make the data more representative of all 
emerging market economies would help produce results that are more in line with my hypothesis 
and other literature. Also, it would be interesting to see how capital flows to emerging market 
economies behave since the Federal Reserve has started to tighten policy. I predict that emerging 
market economies will experience outflows due to tightening U.S. monetary policy, however many 
emerging market economies have stronger fundamentals that could make these countries less 
vulnerable to changes in U.S. policy (Dudley, 2015).  
 As globalization continues to increase (unless the protectionist/isolationist movement in 
the U.S. and Europe continues), understanding how policies in advanced economies affect 
developing nations is important because these nations could have feedback effects into the U.S. 
economy. The key for monetary policy stability and absorbing foreign monetary policy spillovers 
in emerging market economies is to implement a strategy to achieve long-term price stability 
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(Mishkin & Savastano, 2002). While not all monetary policy strategies will be successful for all 
emerging market economies, it is crucial that governments of emerging market economies develop 
a stable and sustainable institutional environment for its banking and financial system (Mishkin & 
Savastano, 2002).  Also, policymakers in emerging market economies can closely monitor the 
federal funds target rate and the GDP growth in the U.S. because, according to my results, 
determine the behavior of capital flows into the BRICS countries. From the perspective of the 
United States, the Federal Reserve can continue to increase transparency through forward 
guidance, providing leaders of emerging market economies guidance on the Federal Reserve 
policy strategies. 
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